

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18 :
CIA-RDP81-00280R001300090001-9

50X1-HUM

de Denie

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/18 :
CIA-RDP81-00280R001300090001-9

PROCESS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

301502² 50X1-HUM

COUNTRY	Bulgaria	REPORT	
SUBJECT	Political Climate after Chervenkov Demotion and Stalin Denigration	DATE DISTR.	31 October 1956
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED		REFERENCES	50X1-HUM

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

50X1-HUM

political situation in Bulgaria after the anti-Stalin campaign and the demotion of Premier Chervenkov.

50X1-HUM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

50X1-HUM

STATE	EX	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI		AIC		OC/ISV	
-------	----	---	------	---	------	---	-----	---	-----	--	-----	--	--------	--

1. [redacted] some observers of the present bulgaria political situation base their beliefs on a substantially erroneous premise, i.e., that Bulgaria has the possibility of carrying out its own autonomous policy, being only guided, at most, with long reins by the USSR. In actual fact this is not the case. Bulgaria is controlled and directed according to precise directives and the wheel is strongly held by the USSR. Thus, political demonstrations of any kind (internal, external, economic, military, etc.) should not be considered as acts of the own Bulgarian authorities and, therefore, capable of showing possible changes in one direction or in another of the country, but should be evaluated in the largest sphere of Soviet policy from which they depend.

2. [redacted] in the Western world there exists the belief that there has been a definite "turn" in Soviet policy and that, consequently, this may have succeeded in determining the actions in the Bulgarian Communist Party as well as in the Communist parties of other satellite countries. Doing this is using a unit of measure which, though valid for the Western world, is not to be used in analysing the Communist world. On the contrary, it should be remembered that nothing is substantially changed. In actual practice, the bomb that exploded upon the declaration of the denegation of Stalin, if it were a powerful bomb in the Western world, was only an inoffensive grenade in the Communist circles behind the Iron Curtain. It was obvious that the denegation

50X1-HUM

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1-HUM

POOR ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 2

50X1-HUM

of Stalin had started, in fact, much before the first official pronouncement on the subject. In fact, the killing of Beria, and downfall of Malenkov, the spirit of Geneva, the improvement of relations with Tito, the disillusion of the Cominform were to all intents and purposes part of the denegation of Stalin.

3. [] the declaration of the new 50X1-HUM "Soviet political line" was to have been and should be considered a simple formal sanctioning of an attitude assumed some time ago; however, it was made at an opportune time in order to counterbalance the failures at Geneva and to find something which could help toward the ultimate purpose of Soviet policy to gain time on the West and to undermine and crush their organization. It is apparent that the plan achieved fully its aims. A certain amount of disorientation existed at first probably within the party, but was probably immediately overcome when the danger of tumbling was seen. In the face of this danger, in fact, the men of the party must have put aside the personal motives of resentment toward each other and have united themselves solidly in order to strengthen the party.

4. Another consideration which would seem to justify statements made in paragraph 1 above is ¹⁰⁴⁴⁵ ~~Zhivkov~~ who has been First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party since November 1950. The seniority of his position is already in itself an eloquent sign of noteworthy stability of his position. Furthermore, he is an individual who appears to have followed a consistent line, keeping away from any

50X1-HUM

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] himself at any time.
 It was he who gave the speech at the National Assembly proposing the nomination
 of Yugov as President of the Council on occasion of the resignation submitted
 by Cervenkov. This task was his by right, but he had the good taste of not
 announcing on that occasion a single word which could have been considered
 derogatory to the outgoing President. Thus, there is nothing that would
 make one foresee his downfall unless they should come from an entirely dif-
 ferent direction other than recrimination toward his activities or decline
 of his political position. Such a situation could be, for example, one in
 which Cervenkov assumed the position of Secretary General of the Party in
 case it was desired to bring him back to the forefront (as many signs seem
 to indicate) without granting him again the leadership of the Bulgarian
 Government.

5. [REDACTED] it is a serious error to hold, as some do, that 50X1-HUM
 Yugov sold himself to the Soviets in order to obtain a presidency of the Council.
 A man who, born in 1904, a member of the Communist Party since 1928, who in
 1932 was a leader of the Macedonian Communist Party, was condemned to death
 in 1934, escaped to the Soviet Union where he underwent two consecutive years
 of intensive training at the School of Marxism and Leninism (directed by Tito),
 who was sent clandestinely back to Bulgaria and arrested, who was a partisan
 in charge of an armed group during all the period of World War II, and
 who finally held high positions in the Bulgarian Government from 1944 till
 today, such a man has been "sold" for at least 30 years. Yugov has come to
 power as premier of Bulgaria for various reasons: (a) he certainly is friendly
 with the Yugoslavs, (b) at the same time he is also Macedonian, (c) he had

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4

50X1-HUM

no reason for getting rid of Gervenkov, (d) he represents a sort of ideal return to the Dimitrov principles of whom he was the most efficient collaborator, a return which is well placed within the theory of present Soviet policy of denigration of Stalin and reconciled relations with Yugoslavia. Those reasons for Yugov's staying in power are not so much that he is supported by the Bulgarian Communist Party (it appears that Yugov has a minimum capacity for conducting government affairs) as much as reasons of undoubtedly Soviet inspired and upheld by men of the Party.

6. [] does not feel that there are real and true rivalries within the Bulgarian Government and within the Bulgarian Communist Party, particularly because of the two following reasons: (a) because the present situation is so fluid and delicate that in actual practice no one has the intention of taking in this moment a position of absolute predominance which could be short-lived. Everyone prefers to maintain his position, observing closely the development of events without increasing the weight of his own responsibilities; (b) because the disorientation, not a crisis, inevitably brought about by the new trend has indicated the necessity for concord, truce, and union. The name of Chankov came to the forefront in the earliest times in which there was talk of the downfall of Gervenkov (June 1955). This was only temporary. Many other names were also mentioned (Transki, Mihailov, and finally Yugov), but no longer the name of Chankov. There do not appear to have been real and true purges in the Party, also because this would have been contrary to the spirit of concord, at least temporary, which existed. However, it appears that certain persons, particularly in the Army

50X1-HUM

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1-HUM

[REDACTED]

(General Pimov, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, General Kopcev, General Karapicov of the Ministry of Interior) were arrested because at the time of the downfall of Gervenkov they spoke too openly against him.

7. [REDACTED] in theory at least the downfall of Gervenkov was not decreed neither by Moscow nor by the Bulgarian Communist Party, but by Gervenkov himself who decided from one moment to the next to offer his resignation. That he didn't particularly care to do this is obvious from the fact that he openly declared himself converted to the idea of a rapprochement with Yugoslavia (see the speech made by him on the occasion of the 20th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party), when his aversion to Tito was to be considered, the only reason for his elimination. In actual practice since the downfall of Gervenkov came within the sphere of the denigration of Stalin it would seem that it was decreed by the Bulgarian Communist Party. However, since even before he presented his resignation, the Yugoslav authorities knew exactly the name of his successor, and since the change of Government took place on the occasion of a visit of a Yugoslav parliamentary commission to Bulgaria, it is felt that the USSR certainly was not ignorant of these events. Encho Stajkov and Bojan Bulgarinov cannot be considered as chiefs of an opposition. They are not top-level individuals, on the contrary. For this very reason they attacked with violence Gervenkov, assuming a strong attitude in the moment of weakness of the chief of the Bulgarian Government, they had hoped to improve their position which, on the contrary, remained secondary and perhaps will be compromised if one day Gervenkov returns to power. At the present time it is felt that all of the Party

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 6

50X1-HUM

and of the Government, including ~~Yugov~~, are rather pro than against ~~Cervankov~~, and this because of the revolution (certainly wanted by Moscow) of the situation by which ~~Cervankov~~ regains ever greater power, and there is proof of this also in the duties assigned him in the economic direction of the country.

8. there is no proof that Karlo Lukanov is advancing toward the first place in the Bulgarian Government. His position is undoubtedly strong, stronger than the sixth place which he presently holds in the governmental hierarchy would indicate. He, too, is a man of Moscow and is perhaps the best informed of the actual intentions of the Soviets because of his lengthy stay in Moscow as Ambassador, interrupted only by his appointment to Deputy Prime Minister. He is or aspires to be the Mikoyan of the Bulgarian Government.

50X1-HUM

9. A real sense of envy of the Yugoslav position took place both in the great masses of people as well as in the Government and Party circles themselves following the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Belgrade in May 1955. The word circulated that in a few days Tito had obtained from Russia, after years of deviationism, much more than Bulgaria had obtained after years and years of total submission. A condition of independence from the USSR similar to that of Yugoslavia is actually desired by all even though no one (except those not members of the Party) dares to affirm this openly. The chief supporters of such a thesis among higher level people are: (a) General Trunski; he as a student of Tito would be more in favor of being under Yugoslavia than having a real and true independence for Bulgaria; (b) strange and paradoxical as it may seem, ~~Cervankov~~ himself, at least at the present time. Now, having recently been burned, he continues

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

50X1-HUM

to feel himself to be the strongest in all the most capable of all, who feels that he is followed by the strongest in all the world, he has thought of assuming a stronger position, even against Moscow. But it appears that in order to do this he would have liked to have felt himself supported by the West just as Tito in his time was supported by the West. (c) General Ivan Mihailov does not appear to have increased his political strength. He is well supported in Yugoslavia and his name came up frequently at the time when guesses were being made as to the successor of Gervenkov. But it would appear that his candidacy to the presidency cannot be carried out because he would have to liquidate all the state security forces. All of which would bring about a rather serious crisis of the existence of the Bulgarian Communist Party itself.

10. It is not known which former Kostov followers have been liberated from prisons. It is only known that a measure of clemency on the part of the Government was planned, but was not carried out, it appears, because of the insurrections which occurred in Poznan, Poland, at the time. Work had started on the official rehabilitation of Kostov and the commission was named, presided by ^{Gen.} Trunski, which was to carry out the official rehabilitation. But this work ceased shortly thereafter, at the same time as Tito's visit to Moscow. This does not appear to be a coincidence, but may indicate the desire of clarifying the position of Tito with regard to the ^{Khrushchev} Khrushchev before adopting any kind of solution which might in any way be prejudicial to the present Government's heads. It is not known if the widow of Kostov returned in the Communist Party, it is only known that she spoke with Khrushchev and Bulgaria during their visit to Sofia in June, 1955, and that immediately

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 8

50X1-HUM

after, the Bulgarian Government granted her a pension and housing.

11. Pictures and monuments of Stalin are still in evidence in many places. They are no longer seen on the occasion of national feasts such as the first of May, and are being replaced with pictures of Blagoev, the founder of the Bulgarian Communist Party. There has been no popular reaction against the denegation of Stalin because, as stated above, this was already in effect when it was officially proclaimed. In any case ~~there~~ attempts were made not to make this thing too obvious or to give it ~~such great silence~~, ^{as a sign of contempt.} ~~at least official, was preferred and no grandiose gesture of knocking down statues or covering them with sheets was carried out.~~

12. It is felt that the election of ~~Yugov~~ ^{Ge} has meant the return to the ideals of Dimitrov and this, within the sphere of the denegation of Stalin and that of a rapprochement with Tito. A rapprochement, however, always ^{govern to the desires and directives of Moscow, and not entrusted to an} ~~govern to the desires and directives of Moscow, and not entrusted to an~~ individual capable of acting ^{as Bulgarian} ~~according to his own wishes.~~ For the Yugoslavs, the coming to power of ~~Yugov~~ ^{Ge} is a success but not full success. If it had been up to them exclusively perhaps he would not have even been elected. It should be remembered in fact that he, even though he may be pro-Yugoslav and better, pro-Tito, is still a Macedonian and a Bulgarian Macedonian. Rumors are already circulating regarding the resignation of ~~Yugov~~ ^{Ge}. This will take place only when and if the USSR, and not Yugoslavia, approves. The Bulgarian Communist Party is prepared to do everything that the USSR desires even though at times may do it against its will.

CONFIDENTIAL

50X1-HUM

Control of the USSR over Bulgaria

13. There are no indications of a diminished Soviet control over Bulgaria.

On the contrary, a certain increase in control in the military field, possibly brought about following the troubles in Poland. Also, the recent promises of "assistance" toward the development of atomic installations allows the Soviets new and more extensive forms of control. One thing is certain, that Soviet consulars and personnel ~~nowhere~~ have not been withdrawn from Bulgaria.

14. Current popular opinion of the Bulgarian regime is not changed with the changing leaders. Nothing has changed. The person of ~~Yugov~~ is no more acceptable than that of ~~Gervenkov~~, perhaps less acceptable. The great masses of the Bulgarian people do not forget ~~Yugov's~~ connections with the murders of 1944 when he was Chief of Police and it is remembered of him that "his hands are soiled with blood." Possibility of a reestablishment of the nation's diplomatic relations with the United States is a problem which concerns the directing class rather than the people. It should be stated, however, that a number of people blames the United States for the present situation. Bulgaria claiming that America has not helped Bulgaria as it did many other countries, and it determined how it thought about this state of subjugation to the USSR, not accepting to deal with the Bulgarian delegates in Cairo for the armistice of 1944.

15. There is no form of open or even clandestine assistance. The people are definitely suffering and would have definite reasons for open rebellion, but they are oppressed by a police regime, are afraid, cannot feel protected, nor do they see possibilities of organization and everyday become more and more resigned to their situation.

Page 10

50X1-HUM

16. [REDACTED] some "pure" Communists have been trying for some time to ingratiate themselves one way or the other with the West. Although remaining Communists, they want to prepare an alibi or at least something to lean on at some future date. This might indicate that they know or feel that there will be considerable changes taking place in Bulgaria within the next three months. These changes would allegedly consist in the complete downfall of Gervanov. Gervanov, who today continues to have still great powers, ^{has} allegedly been destined by Moscow to crumble completely.

17. A recent decision to eliminate circulation permits in new areas is allegedly aimed at getting rid of one of the objections the United States have to the reopening of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, and to adopt such a decision prior to the possible arrival of Americans in order not to give them the impression that having arrived here, they were to obtain more than the other Western diplomatic missions were able to obtain in a lengthy time.

50X1-HUM